

8 July 1971

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The "Pentagon Papers"

I. Background

1. The set of documents that has become known as the "Pentagon Papers" is in fact a study entitled "United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967" produced by a group labelled "Vietnam Task Force" in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The study consists of 47 volumes of text plus a four-page "47th volume" that includes a four-page transmittal memorandum by which Leslie R. Gelb (Chairman of Task Force) formally forwarded the whole study to the Secretary of Defense plus a two-page "outline" (i. e., table of contents). This "volume 47" is appended to this memorandum.

2. As a quick examination of the outline will indicate, the study is an amalgam of narrative text by members of the Task Force, plus it plus compendia of official documents grouped by period of time, both. In virtually every volume, the narrative text is interspersed with (and usually quite interspersed with) a variety of official documents. In all of these are reproduced separately in the document. In many cases the quotations are collectively so extensive that the document in question is reproduced at some point of official history. In addition, every volume (and, usually, every section of a volume) has a fairly elaborate set of footnotes which cite by full name and number (e. g., SNIE 10-4-54) and issue date virtually every document discussed, alluded to or quoted from in the text itself. These citations, quoted from or discussed span the entire classification of overt published material (e. g., books and articles) to Top Secret documents carrying a variety of additional restrictive indicators.

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3. The study was commissioned in June 1967 by then Secretary McNamara who levied the requirement on the Office of International Security Affairs, at that time headed by John McNaughton. Morton H. Halperin, McNaughton's Deputy for Policy Planning and Arms Control, was apparently given command oversight of the project and the Task Force which did the actual work was chaired by one of Halperin's subordinates, Leslie H. Gelb. (Both Gelb and Halperin are now with the Brookings Institute.) Some 30-40 people -- officers from the military services, Defense Department civilian employees (including Daniel Ellsberg) and a variety of outside consultants, many but not all from the RAND Corporation -- seemed to have worked on various parts of the study at various times. Despite the dates given in its title (1945-1967), from the standpoint of substance the study effectively cuts off with President Johnson's 18 March 1968 speech. When the various parts of the study were actually written cannot be determined with certainty though its various portions were clearly written by different people at different times and the end result is much more a collection of separate monographs than a unified whole. It would appear that all portions of the study were completed by the summer or early fall of 1968. A glance at Gelb's transmittal memorandum will demonstrate however, the study was not formally dispatched through channels to the Secretary of Defense (Mr. Clifford) until 15 January 1969 -- a Wednesday. President Nixon's inauguration was, of course, on Monday, 20 January 1969. Thus the study was in fact dispatched with only two working days left before the change of administration in the Defense Department.

II. Parochial Damage Assessment

4. There are repeated references to the Agency, its activities, its officers (some identified by name) and its alleged positions throughout most of the narrative portion of the study. Also the narrative is replete with allusions to, discussions of and quotations from (augmented by specific footnote citations) a wide range of Agency documents: operational and raw field reports, Headquarters disseminations, NIE's and SNIE's, internal memoranda and studies (from ONE, OER, OCI, the DDI and special groups), informal and in some cases internal memoranda and memoranda from the DCI (Mr. McCone) to the President. In assessing the damage done in having the study pass in its entirety into the public domain and/or unfriendly hands (e.g., the Soviet Government), it must of course be

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recognized that all of the material in the Pentagon study is now at least three years old and some of it is over twenty years old. Nonetheless, we are concerned about the following areas of actual or potential damage:

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7. Given the fact that -- whatever be its legal status or name -- a struggle is going on in which the U.S. is involved on one side and North Vietnam on the other, in which armed force is being used, Americans are being killed, and which the U.S. Government is trying to end through negotiations currently in progress -- it is hard to escape the fact that the leak of the Pentagon papers provides propaganda and political action ammunition of inordinate value to those presently engaged in armed conflict with the United States.

8. Finally, the leak of the study raises the whole range of issues associated with the right -- or even ability -- of the U.S. Government to conduct private business privately. It also raises a range of basic issues concerning the right or ability of officials in any administration to engage in frank debates or discussions associated with their official responsibilities without having their views and actions subject to hostile, out-of-context criticism at some later date and in some changed and later climate but within a time span whereby such retrospective review can adversely affect such officials' public or private careers without their having any effective means of seeking recourse or redress. In short, the leak of the Pentagon papers raises the basic issue of the U.S. Government's right or ability to have or protect secrets of any nature.

IV. Other Pertinent Considerations

9. One of the major questions obviously raised by the matter of the Pentagon papers is that of precisely what is now floating about in unauthorized hands outside of government control. The answer is that we do not really know. Ellsberg, for one, clearly had access to the whole study and is presumed to have copied all of it. He is believed to have turned over a complete version to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1970. Apparently he did not give a complete version to the New York Times since that paper, by the inventory it furnished the court, does not have the four negotiations volumes that constitute section VI-C. Whether these volumes are floating around elsewhere is a matter of conjecture, though there are grounds for believing that the Soviet Embassy (at least) was given a complete set by someone.

10. The study itself is patently tendentious, partial and axe-grindingly selective. It is much more of a background file for a future prosecution brief than a balanced or comprehensive historical survey. The circumstances of the study's preparation, the timing of its official transmittal forward from its originators, and the distribution of its copies inevitably generate certain questions about the intentions of those who supervised its preparation. Also the study itself has one glaring omission that could hardly have been inadvertent: There is no volume V-B-5, i. e., while there are nine volumes of internal documents written during the administrations of Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy, there is no such volume of documents for the administration of President Johnson -- though Johnson-era documents were clearly used (and cited) by the study's authors and, hence, clearly in their possession.

11. We know that in addition to what is in the study itself, Ellsberg had in his possession certain other papers, some of which (known as "Related Documents") were in a folder of his found at RAND. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Some of these related documents have been incorporated in material published in the New York Times, but we really do not know the totality of what was/is in Ellsberg's possession or is now in the possession of the Times or some other paper.

12. In a 26 June story, the Chicago Sun-Times made reference to an alleged 1969 CIA "estimate" purportedly disavowing the domino theory. The estimate in question (which was, to put it mildly, distorted in the Sun-Times story) was in fact issued in November 1968. But a careful examination of the Sun-Times story and the estimate's text leads to the conclusion that what was leaked was not the estimate itself but someone's commentary or summary of it, probably prepared in conjunction with work on the 29-question Vietnam assessment that constituted NSSM-1 -- work that was in fact done in the spring of 1969. Whether or not this particular hypothesis is correct, the 26 June Sun-Times story convincingly demonstrates that highly classified Vietnam-related material considerably later in date than anything in the Pentagon papers is also floating about outside of government control. In short, there is the very real possibility that the leak of the Pentagon papers may prove to be only an opening salvo in a campaign of selective major leaks by persons opposed to the war and that once the interest in the Pentagon study begins to wane, new sets of classified

documents of more recent vintage may be surfaced in public print. What we have assessed to date, consequently, may well prove to be but the first chapter of our final damage assessment.

Attachment

"Final Report - OSD Task Force, Vietnam & Index"

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FINAL REPORT - OSD Task Force, Vietnam

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